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SPECTRUM SET-ASIDES AS
CONTENT-NEUTRAL METRIC:
CREATING A PRACTICAL BALANCE BETWEEN
MEDIA ACCESS AND MARKET POWER
Michael M. Epstein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the practicality and desirability of a public
access system for digital broadcasters. While the repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine and the Supreme Court's decision in Miami HeraldPublishing
Co. v. Tornillot have put a damper on the longstanding efforts of access
advocates, the time is ripe to recognize that the new technologies of
digital multiplexing and spatial zoning not only make a robust public
access system legally feasible, but potentially desirable for government
regulators, broadcasters and the public.
In a recent article, I proposed a theory of public access based on the
contractual principle of bargained-for exchange, or quid pro quo.2 This
theory is predicated on the idea that broadcasters would agree to provide
access to the public in return for increased market power that
broadcasters are eager to secure from Congress.3 This Article looks less
at the theories that would justify an application of quid pro quo to
speech, and more to the law and policy considerations that would relate
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School; M.A. Michigan; Ph.D. Michigan. Special thanks to Andrew Schwartzman of the Media
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First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media Reform" conference held at Hofstra Law
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1. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
2. See generally Michael M. Epstein, Broadcast Technology as Diversity Opportunity:
Exchanging Market Powerfor Multiplexed Signal Set-Asides, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3 (2007).
3. Id. at 44-45.
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to placing a voluntary access-for-market-power system into practice. If
devised well, such a system has the potential to address many of the
objectives of the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine, which broadcasters
actively opposed, and which proved to be ineffective as a right of
broadcast access for citizens.4
II.

AVOIDING THE PROBLEMS OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE

The biggest obstacle to the Fairness Doctrine was not the legality of
its provisions-Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC established its
constitutionality5Sbut, persistent opposition from broadcasters that
culminated in an abandonment of the policy by the FCC.6 Although
there is abundant evidence to show that the Fairness Doctrine works well
as a right of reply to a personal attack,7 there was simply no incentive for
broadcasters to be cooperative in other instances in which the doctrine
was being invoked. Because the Fairness Doctrine, as a general matter,
mandated that airtime be made available to speakers and issues in
response to aired content, broadcasters argued that the burden on their
speech rights was too high. In their arguments before the FCC,
broadcasters chafed at the idea that coverage of a particular controversy,
or comments directed toward an individual or political issue, would
result in an obligation to air speech that they otherwise would not
advocate. 9 For broadcasters, the Fairness Doctrine also failed because
this obligation to air content allegedly was bad for news, and bad for
business. The broadcast lobby also raised the specter of a chilling effect
in the television newsroom, since the decision to cover an issue of
controversial public importance or take a stand on an issue would act as
a trigger of the access obligation.' From a business standpoint, the
doctrine was also disruptive. Time used to meet a broadcaster's Fairness
Doctrine obligation was time that would have otherwise been used to air
content that viewers wanted to see, and advertisers wanted to buy. Some
broadcasters believed that the more controversial a station's coverage

4. See, e.g., Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'ns Rules and Regs. Concerning the
General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 147, 168-69
(1986) [hereinafter Fairness Doctrine Obligations].
5. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
6. See Fairness Doctrine Obligations, supra note 4, at 246-48.
7. See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide, After the FairnessDoctrine: ControversialProgramming
and the Public Interest, 40 J. COMM. 47 (1990).
8. See Fairness Doctrine Obligations, supra note 4, at 146.
9. Id. at 147, 164-65.
10. Id. at 162.
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was, the greater the risk that the government would require the station to
cede time for speech it did not favor or control.1'
Despite some successes, the Fairness Doctrine was rejected by
broadcasters and the FCC because it purported to offer both a right of
reply and a right of access for citizens.1 2 Professor Barron, in an article
written to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Miami Herald,
distinguishes a right of access from a right of reply on the basis of the
former's content-neutrality. 3 As a practical matter, the Fairness
Doctrine really was neither. The best that can be said about the Fairness
Doctrine is that it was a content-triggered opportunity for limited access
by a select few. With the exception of the Personal Attack provisions of
the Fairness Doctrine, which did allow a right to reply to attacked
individuals, the Fairness Doctrine did not give the public a right to reply
to a broadcaster. 14 Instead, the broadcaster was obliged to give the public
only a "reasonable opportunity" to access its airwaves.1 5 In most
instances, the broadcaster determined who the appropriate respondent to
their speech could be, and there was no obligation that the views of other
complainants would be aired.1 6 For groups or individuals that wanted to
be heard on a specific issue, correct an inaccuracy, or lodge a complaint,
the Fairness Doctrine was not a reliable, obstacle-free avenue to access.
Even the rarely invoked first prong of the Doctrine, which obligated a
broadcaster to cover controversial issues of public importance, was not
understood to give the public a right to access a television or radio
station; the goal of this prong, largely unfulfilled, was to permit
against broadcasters who were not acting in the public
complaints
7
interest.'
While the goals of the Fairness Doctrine are laudable, especially if
one believes, as the Supreme Court did in 1969, that the burdens on
interests,1 8
broadcaster's speech are outweighed by the public's speech
the reality is that, without action in Congress, fairness obligations will
not be unilaterally imposed on broadcasters. In recent months, there has
been a flurry of activity over the prospect of reviving some form of the
11.
12.

Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 147.

13. See Jerome A. Barron, The Right of Reply to the Media in the United States-Resistance
and Resurgence, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).

14. See Fairness Doctrine Obligations, supra note 4, at 225.
15. Seeid. at 146.
16. Id. at 160-61.
17. See id. at 160 (discussing a broadcaster's obligation to "give coverage to an issue found to
be of critical importance to its particular community").
18. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969).
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Fairness Doctrine, both for and against, in Congress.1 9 Still, even if
Congress were to act, opposition from broadcasters, in litigation and in
practice, would limit the doctrine's effectiveness. Imposing fairness
obligations on reluctant broadcasters may indeed be in the public's
interest; but unless Congress or the FCC devises a system that
broadcasters can embrace, either as a complement or as an alternative to
fairness obligations, the goal of providing citizens with a robust right of
access to broadcasting will not be reached in the United States.
In many respects, the debate over public access to the airwaves is
not new. In 1973, the Supreme Court visited the issue in Columbid
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.z ° In the
CBS decision, the court determined that no right of access existed under
the Constitution or the Communications Act. In rejecting the petitioner's
attempt to expand the Fairness Doctrine to include mandatory access for
editorial advertisements, the Court ruled that preventing licensees from
exercising discretion would pose a "substantial danger [to the] effective
operation of that doctrine., 21 At first blush, the CBS decision seems to
close the door on a right of access scheme. But it is important to note
that the Supreme Court's rejection of non-discretionary access is made
specifically in relation to its impact on the effectiveness of the Fairness
Doctrine. And while the opinion rejects access as an entitlement, it
explicitly leaves open the possibility for a non-discretionary program for
public access, stating that "[c]onceivably at some future date Congress
or the Commission--or the broadcasters-may devise some kind of
limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable. 'z Indeed,
in 1974, a group known as the Committee for Open Media petitioned the
FCC to consider an optional access program called "Free Speech
23
Messages" ("FSM") as a potential alternative to the Fairness Doctrine.
Under the program, participating broadcasters would have been required
to designate announcement spots at different times of the day for public
access. While half of the spots would be given to "representative
19.

Senator Diane Feinstein said that she was considering legislation for a "fixe[d]" version

of the Fairness Doctrine. See Feinstein Might Push for Fairness Doctrine, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
June 24, 2007, http://www.upi.com/NewsTrackrTop-News/2007/06/24/feinsteinmight-push-

forfairness doctrine/9684/.
20.
21.

412 U.S. 94(1973).
Id. at 124.

22.
23.

Id.at13l.
See generally Access is Fairness: A Petition for Reconsideration of the Federal

Communications Commission's Fairness Report, F.C.C. Docket No. 19260; see also The Handling

of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the
Communication Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report,
58 F.C.C.2d 691, 692 (Mar. 24, 1976) [hereinafter Handling of Public Issues].
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spokespersons" in the community, the other half of the spots would have
been available on a first-come, first-served basis to the general public. In
1976, the FCC rejected the FSM proposal, citing the Supreme Court's
concerns in the CBS case. The FCC determined that the proposal was
"neither perfected nor ready for adoption" as a substitute for the Fairness
Doctrine. At the same time, however, the FCC left open the possibility
that such a plan might help broadcasters meet their fairness obligations,
stating that a system of public access "has the potential to offer a format
which acts consistently and complementarily with the purposes of the
doctrine.24 Perhaps the time is ripe for the FCC to reconsider their
position on non-discretionary access as a practical way for broadcasters
to meet their fairness obligations, whether or not the fairness doctrine is
revived.
III.

THE PROMISE OF DIGITAL

MULTICASTING

For a public access system to be practical for all interested parties,
it must meet several criteria. First, it cannot be a right of reply or even a
triggered opportunity for access. To avoid an arguable chilling effect to
both broadcasters and citizens, the access system must be content-neutral
in its selection of speakers. It must also be easy to implement, be free or
low-cost for the public to use, and not disruptive to the needs of
broadcasters to program airtime. Such a combination of factors is hard to
achieve when a broadcaster has only a single window for programming.
With digital spectrum, however, broadcasters have the option to
multicast into .several programming windows simultaneously.25
Multicasting-sometimes also referred to as "multiplexing"-permits
broadcasters to allocate portions of their assigned bandwidth to lower
definition programming streams, all which are easily accessible to the
public as sub-channels on a digital television receiver.2 6 By allowing
multicasting, Congress has provided incumbent licensees with a
lucrative alternative to High Definition Television. Instead of airing a
single program in high-definition, a broadcaster can now be a
multichannel programmer-in effect, acting as if it were a cable multi
system operator ("MSO") in miniature.27 In 2007, broadcasters are
touting the roll-out of high-definition programming as a milestone in

24.
25.
Service,
26.
27.

Handling of Public Issues, supranote 23, at 699.
See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast
First Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, 5628 (1990).
Id.
id.
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television programming. But despite the hoopla, such a milestone, in an
age of proliferating entertainment sources and niche markets, may be too
costly for broadcasters if they wish to stay economically competitive.
High-definition programs may still air, but either with less resolution so
that one or two additional streams can transmit, or at certain times of day
such as prime time (or both). While one can question the wisdom of
Congress in giving broadcasters an incentive not to broadcast in highdefinition, even in these relatively early days of digital broadcasting, the
practice of signal multicasting among licensees is already clear.
At the beginning of 2007, the National Association of Broadcasters
("NAB") reports that 1,625 channels are broadcasting in digital.28
According to multicasting.com, a website controlled by the NAB, nearly
600 broadcasters are dividing their high-definition spectrum bandwidth
as of this writing. 29 The popularity of multicasting among broadcasters is
such that eighty-five percent of stations currently multicast, or plan to in
the immediate future. 30 The fifteen percent who do not plan to multicast
are not against signal division-they either do not have specific plans in
the works or are non-respondents.3 1 It is no wonder that the broadcast
industry is quickly turning to multicast technology-the opportunities to
use spectrum in new and different ways is tempting for stations that are
eager to stem audience -erosion to cable. and Internet. For broadcasters
used to programming for the lowest common denominator, the prospect
of simultaneously streaming to different audiences and different
demographics holds the potential for a boom in an increasingly
fragmented, and fickle, entertainment market.
In 2006, the FCC's media bureau sought public comments on the
practice of multicasting among digital broadcasters, as part of its
ongoing digital television docket.32 While the FCC is not necessarily
concerned about the practice, it is interested in gathering information on
the number of programming streams multicast, the frequency of
multicasting, and the nature of the multicast programming. According to
the NAB's comments, twenty stations were apportioning their full
28. National

Association

of

Broadcasters,

DTV

Stations

in

Operation,

http://www.nab.org/AM/ASPCode/DTVStations/DTVStations.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
29. National Association of Broadcasters, About Multicasting, www.multicasting.com/
aboutmulticastingl5.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).

30.

Letter from David K. Rehr, President & CEO, NAB to Chairman & Comm'rs, FCC,

(F.C.C. Docket No. 98-120, June 8, 2006), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native or pdf=pdf&id-document=6518359495 [hereinafter NAB Letter to FCC].
31. Id.
32. Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,592 (Nov. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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spectrum into one additional programming stream. 33 Of these, thirteen
stations used their secondary "sub-channel" to broadcast a twenty-four
hour weather or news service, such as NBC Weather Plus and ABC
World News Now, which each network makes available to its respective
affiliates. 34 In at least four cases, stations are using a secondary
programming stream to air a fledgling network that would otherwise not
be represented on the local broadcast dial. 35 The biggest recipient of this
practice is the CW network, the successor to UPN and the WB, which
has gained access to the Madison, WI, Roanoke, VA, and Austin, TX
broadcast markets. 36 The Austin station used a second "sub-channel" to
offer Rupert Murdoch's now-discontinued English-language telenovela
service, My Network TV, and stations in Ohio, Indiana and New York
similarly allocate an additional sub-channel to Telemundo or other
Spanish-language programming.37 These stations are among the eight
that have divided their signals into two or more streams, and most of
these stations include not only ethnic programming from Latin America
38
or Asia, but also locally-originated news and entertainment.
Of the eight multiple streamers, two stand out as the early adopters
of the new multicast business model: NBC's flagship owned and
operated ("0 & 0") station in New York City, WNBC-DT and WDBJDT in Roanoke. WNBC currently transmits its main channel and four
additional programming streams devoted to Telemundo, local affairs,
NBC Weather Plus, 39 and an Independent producer showcase that invites
viewers to submit content for airing.40 Roanoke's WDBJ similarly
transmits the CW network, real-time weather, and local programming
not otherwise available in the market on three sub-channels.4 1 Of course,
it is not a coincidence that the number one adopter of multicasting is the
flagship NBC-owned station. WNBC's programming represents one of
the great attractions of multicasting for media companies that produce
content: more conduits for distribution of that content. In the case of the
33. See NAB Letter to FCC, supra note 30; Letter from Marsha J. MacBride, Executive Vice
President, NAB to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, (F.C.C. Docket No. 98-120, June 13, 2006),
tat
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf=pdf&iddocumen
available
6518359712 [hereinafter NAB June 13 Letter].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
Plus,
Weather
NBC
Find
to
How
Network,
Plus
39. NBC Weather
http://wnbc.nbcweatherplus.com/weatherplustv/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
40. NAB June 13 Letter, supra note 33.
41. NAB Letter to FCC, supra note 30.
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NBC-owned station, all of the sub-channels air content that is owned by
the network, which provides NBC with a double benefit. NBC provides
more content to its local station, and builds a greater national
following-and higher ad revenue-for its national programming
services, like NBC Weather Plus and Telemundo. 42 At this point,
Weather Plus has been launched in ninety local markets, and reaches
seventy-five percent of the country.4 3 In response, CBS and ABC have
introduced their own local weather and news sub-channels in dozens of
markets. 4 As of May 22, 2006, ABC had begun to multicast the
Accuweather service in sixteen markets. CBS plans to launch CBS 2 on
its twenty-one owned stations, offering a mix of news, weather and local
programming, as well as entertainment to complement its primary
network. After the FCC-mandated transition from analog to digital
broadcasting, when virtually 100 percent of viewers will be able to
receive multicast signals, content producers will have the option of
moving a channel that is currently distributed over cable to a multicast
sub-channel. NBC could decide, for example, that it is more profitable to
place its MSNBC cable service on all of part of a broadcast sub-channel,
ending the need to negotiate with cable MSOs for channel space or
license fees. 0 & 0 stations can also broadcast another company's
programming service, but one wonders why they would want to do that
when the FCC permits them to own and syndicate the content they
distribute.
Network affiliates and independent stations, especially those owned
by a station group with multiple licenses, can also develop their own
proprietary content to distribute on their stations, or strike exclusive
distribution deals with other independent producers, effectively allowing
them to become a mini-network. Tribune Broadcasting airs "The Tube,"
a twenty-four hour music video programming service, in major markets
like New York and Los Angeles.4 5 In the near future, "The Tube" will
air on twenty-six Tribune-owned stations reaching thirty percent of total
United States households, including those in nine of the top ten

42. Id.
43. Katy Bachman, NBC, Affiliates Form National Broadband Co., MEDIAWEEK.COM, Apr.

24,

2006,

http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/news/tvstations/articledisplay.jsp?vnu-contentid=

1002383178.
44. See Steve Donohue, Multicast Madness: TV Stations Slow to Add Digital BroadcastsAs
Internet Distribution Revenue Rises, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, June 26, 2006, available at
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6346618.htm].
45. Katy Bachman, Tribune Stations to Carry the Tube, MEDIAWEEK.COM, Mar. 9, 2006,

http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/news/tvstations/article-display.jsp?vnu-content-id=1002155687.
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markets.4 6 One independent producer, Ion Media Networks, is
syndicating a twenty-four hour health channel called "I-Health," which
will air the type of advertiser-supported medical programming one
would see on a specialized cable channel. Promoted as a "value-added
sponsor service at no cost to consumers," Ion's deals with local
broadcasters will enable it to reach sixty-nine million homes.4 7 Ion is
working in tandem with NBC Universal to create an advertisersupported twenty-four hour children's network.48 Such a plan puts this
new sub-channel in direct competition with basic cable channels such as
Nickelodeon and Noggin. Even the Public Broadcasting Service
("PBS"), which distributes independently produced programming to
non-commercial member stations, has announced the development of
four new multicasting channels: a service for older children, a Spanishlanguage service, a non-fiction service, and a lifestyle service. 49 This is
all in addition to their existing "how-to" channel, "Create," which boasts
carriage on local stations reaching nearly sixty-two percent of United
States television households, including stations in sixteen of the top
twenty-five markets. 50 PBS's ambitious multicast roll-out means viewers
will have a commercial-free alternative to cable staples like The History
Channel, The Learning Channel, and ABC Family, which cable
subscribers currently have to pay a monthly fee to receive.
Although many have predicted that continued audience erosion to
cable would eventually supplant broadcasting, multicasting will likely
reverse the flow back to broadcast. With freely available broadcast
copies of MTV, CNN, The Weather Channel, and other basic tier
offerings on television, viewers in the country's largest markets might
balk at paying a monthly subscriber bill to a cable company. While it is
currently not possible to divide digital spectrum into 500 channels, the
prospect of each licensee in a local market splitting spectrum into six
sub-channels means that broadcast audiences will have as many as six
times the number of channels available for viewing than they did before

46. Id.
47. ION Unveils Second Diginet: I-Health, TVNEWSDAY.COM, May 31, 2006, available at
http://www.tvnewsday.com/articles/2006/05/31/daily.4/.
48. The joint venture, also known as Qubo, is already being broadcast on multicast streams.
See qubo.com, http://www.qubo.com/index.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
49. Jeremy Egner, World and Go! Streams Flow into PBS Plans, CURRENT.ORG, Apr. 3,
2006, http://www.current.org/dtv/dtv0606multicast.shtml.
50. See Create TV, http://www.createtv.com/CreateTV.nsf/AboutCreateDisplay?ReadForm&
Index=History (last visited Sept. 12, 2007). Create's largest markets are New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Washington D.C., Detroit, Seattle, Tampa, Minneapolis/St. Paul,
Miami, Denver, St. Louis, Portland and Indianapolis. Id.
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the transition to digital. 51 Assuming that in the Los Angeles market
alone, viewers of broadcast may have access to nearly thirty VHF and
UHF stations-digital viewers could use their television antennae to
tune in roughly 180 channels, without paying a cent for cable-or
satellite-service. 2 Viewers in smaller markets, where fewer stations
air, may be less likely to move away from cable or satellite
subscriptions, at least at present compression rates, but it may be that
they won't need to because of digital must carry. Although the FCC,
after years of deadlock recently ruled that cable systems are required to
retransmit only one programming stream, this decision will be reviewed
53
and, as I have argued elsewhere, is likely to be reversed by the courts.
With digital must carry in place, broadcasters would not have to supplant
cable or satellite as a conduit, and all those multicast streams would
make broadcasters much more competitive as content providers on the
cable dial.
For those viewers interested in premium channels such as HBO,
Showtime or pay-per-view, cable and satellite providers will continue to
have an advantage over broadcasters-at least for the foreseeable future.
Subscriber services, unlike broadcasters, can offer a large number of
specialized premium channels, and they have the technology to impede
access to premium content that subscribers do not opt to receive.
Historically, analog broadcasters have been unable to tap into this
lucrative market segment, a consequence of reception limitations and
customer resistance to encrypted signals that required special equipment
for reception. With digital spectrum, however, the problems of signal
reception and encryption are easily overcome. Since digital signals use
frequencies to transmit binary code, the televisions that receive the code
will display audiovisual content of uniform clarity, despite distance or
weather conditions. Digital televisions can also be programmed to
receive encrypted code so that programming-and even data-can be
transmitted only to those viewers who choose to subscribe to that
content.
Moreover, Congress has given broadcasters the option of allocating
a portion of their spectrum to paid subscriber services. Licensees who

51.

See NAB Letter to FCC, supra note 30.

52. For a complete list of television stations in the Los Angeles market, see Radio Station
World, http://radiostationworld.com/Locations/UnitedStates of America/Califomia/tv.asp?m=los
(last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
53. See Michael M. Epstein, "'Primary Video" and Its Secondary Effects on Digital
Broadcasting: Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under the 1992 Cable Act and the First
Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 525 (2004).
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choose to use their signals for content other than freely accessible overthe-air television need only pay a penalty equaling five percent of the
revenue generated by the subscriber service.54 All of this seems to be a
small price to pay for a broadcaster interested in offering a premium
movie channel-or creating a new one-on a multicast sub-channel. At
the time of this writing, no local station is using a multicast sub-channel
to air subscription television, although one of the largest owners of
station licenses, Sinclair Broadcasting, is reportedly interested in
exploring the concept.5 5 National Datacast, a private, commercial
subsidiary of PBS, has entered into an agreement with a subscription
video-on-demand distribution service that was launched in 2006 by
Disney. The service, known as MovieBeam, uses another company's
proprietary compression technology called DotCast to transmit a
revolving selection of current releases to set-top boxes over the analog
bandwidth of local PBS stations. While MovieBeam does not currently
use digital spectrum, Disney's business model fits perfectly into the
multicast environment. 56 Once the service transitions to digital,
MovieBeam could use PBS station bandwidth without using DotCast
technology, or even remove PBS from the deal altogether by moving
carriage to Disney-owned ABC stations.
IV.

UNMEDIATED ACCESS AS A NEW PARADIGM FOR
DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM

So will the digital broadcast environment of the future look like the
cable channel line-up of today? If so, then the prospect of real diversity
may still be elusive. Indeed, what constitutes real diversity, and how to
measure it, has been the subject of ongoing debate both at the FCC and
in the scholarly community. The FCC has placed a number of different
types of diversity under its mandate: viewpoint diversity, outlet
diversity, program diversity, source diversity, and diversity of ownership

54. See Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Spectrum Pursuant to
Section 336(e)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259,
3267 (Nov. 19, 1998).
55. See Sinclair Broadcasting Group, Digital TV, http://www.sbgi.net/digital-tv/about.shtml
(last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
56. Press Release, PBS News, National Datacast Delivers Movies for MovieBeam (Feb. 22,
2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/news/20060222-moviebeam.html; see also John
Borland, MovieBeam Video Service Launches Nationwide, ZDNET NEWS, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6038909.html.
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by race or gender.57 In addressing the issue, the FCC has defined
viewpoint diversity as setting limits on ownership so that there exist
multiple voices in news and public affairs programming, and outlet
diversity is about assuring independent ownership in local markets to
foster viewpoint diversity. 58 Source diversity refers to a multiplicity of
content producers, and programming diversity is defined as a variety of
program formats and content that can best be achieved by "competition
among delivery systems rather than by government regulation. 59
In 2003, the FCC, under then-chairman Michael Powell, formed a
Federal Advisory Committee of Diversity in Communications in the
Digital Age. But the focus of that Committee appears to have been
mainly on discrimination against minorities and women in the license
application process, and the contentious issue of whether there is a nexus
between the race of a licensee and programming content.60 While both
these issues merit further consideration, the FCC and the Committee
have missed an opportunity to address the other types of diversity in a
way that would effectively bring a multiplicity of sources and content to
the public airwaves. The reason for this missed opportunity is that the
FCC, under Powell's leadership, consistently focused on market
competition in its conception of program diversity, and the proliferation
61
of Internet content providers as a means to ensure source diversity.
The problem with relying on market competition to promote
programming diversity is that the range of the diversity is confined to the
limits of what is profitable-or at least potentially so-in the
marketplace. For broadcasting, this has generally meant programs
designed to attract the largest audience, or a targeted demographic, in
order to maximize advertising revenue.62 Even non-commercial stations,
faced with mounting operating costs, present programs that are attractive
to corporate sponsors, foundations, and viewers like you, in order to
57. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627 (2003).
58.

Id. at 13,627, 13,632.

59. Id. at 13,632.
60. See Sherille Ismail, Senior Counsel, Office of Strategic Planning, FCC, Statement at the
Fordham University Media Diversity and Localism Conference (Dec. 15-16, 2003), available at

http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/public/comm/pnapoli/MediaDiversityLocalismStatements.doc.
61. See Mara Einstein, Queens College, Statement at the Fordham University Media Diversity
and Localism Conference (Dec. 15-16, 2003), available at http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/public/
comm/pnapoli/MediaDiversityLocalismStatements.doc.
62. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 228-29 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that broadcasters' survival is based upon access to the public in order to
maximize profits).
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cover their costs. The result is that there is surprisingly little
programming diversity on the public's airwaves. Whether it is
procedural crime drama, a reality program, or a situation comedy, the
programs one sees on television use formulas that are tired and
derivative, and the messages contained therein represent the values and
objectives of studios, networks, and licensees-a select group of
speakers increasingly owned or controlled by large corporations. While
the FCC recognizes-albeit reluctantly-that there is a connection
between consolidation of station ownership and viewpoint diversity, it
fails to address programming diversity that transcends the bounds of a
corporate agenda. For some, including most in the media, "transcendent"
programs are programs for which there is no market, but the lack of a
market is not the same as not having any following. And even if a
message has no following, such an approach prevents its proponents
from using the public airwaves to promote its agenda in an effort to
inform or persuade.
To address this lack of grassroots access to broadcast media, the
FCC has pushed the notion that new media sources such as the Internet,
are providing the public with a variety of content that accomplish source
diversity. 63 And to some extent that is true. Bloggers today are beginning
to exercise a degree of power in news and public affairs because of their
independence from corporatized media agendas.64 But, as the Third
Circuit acknowledged in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the
"abundance" of media on the Internet does not translate to programming
diversity in broadcasting. 65 And even if it did, the fact that non marketbased messages can be located on an obscure website does not have the
same power-measured by its potential reach to audience-as a message
broadcast to homes that enjoy universal service protected by the
government.6 6
The lack of citizen access to broadcast media undermines localism
of content and speaker. Localism, like diversity, is an objective set forth
by Congress in the Communications Act of 1934.67 And as with
diversity, the FCC has missed an opportunity to foster localism in
broadcasting. Although the FCC has studied the issue under the auspices

63. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 403-04 (3d Cir. 2004).
64. Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analytical Framework
for the 21st Century,44 AM. Bus. L.J. 127, 132 (2007).

65.
66.
tune into
67.

Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 402.
Of course, potential audience reach does not necessarily mean that mass audience will
citizen access programs. See infra Part VII.
Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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of its Localism Task Force, the FCC's view that abundant media and
competitive markets will lead to greater localism is misplaced. As the
Task Force itself learned when it conducted field meetings, market
forces have led to vertical and horizontal consolidation, to the detriment
of localism. 68 In radio, which was deregulated, consolidation of station

ownership by two companies, CBS Radio and Clearchannel, has resulted
in complaints that local musicians cannot get their music played on local
radio stations, since those stations are programmed elsewhere by a
consolidated company without regard to the specific needs or interests of
a community. 69 Similarly, complaints about local news and weather
coverage, especially in times of crisis, have increased, as consolidated
companies close down local news operations to benefit from the
synergies of satellite feeds.70
In television, the FCC, as far back as the 1930s, has protected
locally produced programs over those distributed nationally through the
Chain Broadcasting Rules-regulations that are still in place, despite the
Commission's deregulation philosophy. 71 The must-carry rules, passed
by Congress in 1992 and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1997, reflected
the legislature's specific concern for the continued survival of local
broadcast stations in the face of competition from cable.72 And while the
Turner cases do not define what it means to be a "local program," the
Court upholds Congress's effort to promote localism as content neutral,
and Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in Turner
II goes as far as to state
73
that local programs are worthy of protection.
Despite these various efforts to promote localism, there is no clear
definition of it. Is a local program a program that is produced locally? Is
it a program that addresses an issue of local concern? Does it address an
issue that is present in the local community? Or is it some combination
of these considerations? If a locally created program is sufficient for
localism, then those of us in Los Angeles, where most entertainment
68.

See, e.g., FCC, Localism Proceedings, http://www.fcc.gov/localism/ (last visited Aug. 30,

2007).
69. See Broadcast Localism, Reply Comments, MB Docket No. 04-233 (Jan. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/images/FCClocalismreplycomments.pdf.
70. David Rubin, When Power Went Off, WSYR Failed Listeners, POST STANDARD, Aug. 24,

2003, at C1.
71.

47 U.S.C. § 153(9) (2000).

72. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 634 (1994) (recognizing
that Congress determined that without a must-carry provision "the economic viability of free local
broadcast television and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously
jeopardized") (internal quotations omitted).
73.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 228 (1997) (Breyer, J.,

concurring).
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programs are produced, enjoy the fruits of localism. Yet these programs
are created for national consumption and say little about the Los Angeles
community. (Indeed, it was nationally distributed entertainment
programming like this that originally led the FCC to enact the Chain
Broadcasting Rules.) 74 The FCC ran into a similar problem in the 1970s
when it enacted the Prime Time Access Rule ("PTAR"). The PTAR
prevented networks from distributing programs in early fringe so that
local stations would be able to program as they wished.7 5 The result,
however, was not locally produced programming, nor programming
addressing local issues; instead, local stations chose to air syndicated
game shows, off-net reruns and tabloid shows.76 Today, few programs
on broadcast television are locally produced and locally oriented. Even
the nightly local news has become increasingly non-local, relying on
syndicated features and sister station or network correspondent coverage
of non-local stories.77
If there is any lesson to be learned by the FCC's approaches to both
diversity and localism, it is that these concepts are elusive when the
message is created or distributed by a media company that programs to
the public, instead of by the public itself. Stefaan G. Verhulst, of the
Markle Foundation, has written that policymakers must consider the
roles of intermediaries in our understanding of diversity-an approach
that would apply equally to localism. In a conference statement entitled
Mediation, Mediators, and New Intermediaries, Verhulst notes that
media outlets and owners act as mediators of message and context to
audience, shaping the way citizens construct meaning.78 If mediators are
too few in number, then media companies have too much power to
74. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669,
701 (2005).
75. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with Respect to
Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, 23
F.C.C.2d 382, 384 (1970).
[N]o television station, assigned to any of the top 50 markets in which there are three or
more operating commercial television stations, shall broadcast network programs offered
by any television network or networks for a total of more than 3 hours per day between
the hours of 7 p.m. and II p.m. local time, except that in the Central time zone the

relevant period shall be between the hours of 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.
Id.
76. Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, Section 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules,
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, 574 (1995).
77.

DIANE FARSETTA & DANIEL PRICE, FAKE TV NEWS: WIDESPREAD AND UNDISCLOSED 12

(Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.prwatch.org/pdfs/FakeTVNews_.Apr2006Rpt.pdf.
78. Stefaan G. Verhulst, Markle Foundation, Statement at the Fordham University Media
Diversity and Localism Conference (Dec. 15-16, 2003), available at http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/
public/comm/pnapoli/MediaDiversityLocalismStatements.doc.
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determine the political and cultural worldview of the general public.79
While Verhulst's focus is on the number of mediators and new forms of
automated mediation on the Internet, his understanding of mediative
function offers a powerful argument for public access to broadcasting.
The power "to dictate political, cultural and civic life" of the public
exists, whether there are too few mediators, or whether there are many. 0
Concerns about media's undue influence in setting agendas or defining
debates would continue to be voiced by the public even if broadcast
ownership were diversely held by independent companies. 81 A
multiplicity of broadcast owners would continue to mediate meaning for
the public, perhaps, as Verhulst seems to suggest, with less impact, but
with impact nonetheless.8 2
All of which brings us back to the question of public access. Public
access offers a benefit to the public irrespective of consolidated media
ownership. Put simply, it makes good policy sense to divorce
considerations of diversity and localism from the issue of ownership and
consolidation. With an effective public access system in place, the
government can achieve diversity and localism at a grassroots levelwithout having to rely on metrics of ownership, source and
programming that ultimately quell diversity and overlook localism. 83 At
the same time, the government can promote free market ideology by
allowing for increased consolidation of ownership.84 How much
consolidation would be permitted would be a question for Congress to
decide, but if a system can be developed whereby media companies
would have an incentive to offer more access in return for more market
power, then virtually all parties-broadcasters, government and the
public-could structure a system of mutual benefit.

79.

Id.

80. Id.
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

See Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DUKE L.J.

329, 342 n.50 (1988) ("Public access to cable TV is the most valuable means remaining today to
implement the First [A]mendment. It's the last opportunity citizens have for reaching a mass
audience at an affordable cost.").
84.

This is not to suggest that free market ideology leads to a desirable policy for free speech

and diversity, but an acknowledgment that increased consolidation has been the result of those in
power who favor ownership deregulation.
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V.

MAKING PUBLIC ACCESS WORK FOR GOVERNMENT,
BROADCASTERS AND CITIZENS

In an article recently published in the Federal Communications
Law Journal, I set forth a formula for a quid pro quo bargain between
government and broadcasters. 85 In that article, I proposed that Congress
has the legal justification for setting up a public access system using
digital bandwidth, time, or a combination of each. The formula, which
presents a metric between increased market power and access units,
forms the basis for this proposed Congressional initiative. Such a
formula, which to this author represents an ideal, is only one way to
address the issue of public access to digital broadcasting. In many
respects, a government sponsored quid pro quo system-one that would
potentially incentivize conglomerates to trade newspaper access for
increased broadcast market power-is an attractive proposition for the
public, who, as I stated earlier, currently has no access rights to
broadcasting. 86 But will it be attractive for broadcasters and government,
the two active participants in the bargained-for exchange?
From the standpoint of policymaking, it may make better sense to
frame the quid pro quo not in terms of a formula, or even a metric, but in
terms of what needs to be in place for this system to work in a way that
maximizes the access benefit to the public. To maximize the public's
benefit, both government and broadcasters must see that the benefits of
the bargain to each far outweigh the costs. For government, it means
underscoring that the benefits of digital broadcasting to licensees, as set
forth earlier in this Article, are potentially enormous, and not to be taken
for granted. For broadcasters, it means recognizing that apportioning
spectrum to public access is a small price to pay in order to enjoy the
windfall that digital technology will bring.
For broadcasters, accepting a voluntary public access system,
linked to relaxed ownership limits, is an immediate advantage for the
industry. Under the right political conditions, Congress could
unilaterally introduce legislation requiring broadcasters to set aside
public access spectrum, just as it does for cable and satellite providers.87
Until now, Congress has not even considered a general right of access,
probably because it was not technologically possible with analog signals
to segregate program streams. With one analog channel, the
government's only options would be to implement a time-based access
85. Epstein, supra note 2.
86. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
87. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
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regime, which licensees would likely argue would be too burdensome, or
to require broadcasters to offer a data-driven ancillary service over
unused bandwidth, much like the DotCast technology used by
MovieBeam. 88 At best, broadcasters would argue that a time-based
regime would be unmanageable in practice, as the Fairness Doctrine was
viewed; at worst, they would argue that earmarking minutes or hours per
week on a single channel would place too great a burden on their speech
rights. On this latter point, they would probably lose, as the
Communications Act expressly states that licensees do not have any
property rights in their spectrum-even so, they would be sure to make
the argument. 89 The second option, using ancillary bandwidth to carry a
compressed data stream would require viewers to buy set-top receiving
equipment, an expense and hassle that the public would likely not want
to accept. 90
But with digital signals, segregating a portion of spectrum for
public access is easy-broadcasters of course are already doing this for
their own content-and the burden on licensees is quite low. Dedicating
spectrum to citizen access will not necessarily disrupt programming or
cost revenue. While licensees could certainly argue that opening any
amount of digital spectrum to the public burdens their speech rights, is it
unduly burdensome when you measure that burden against the huge
benefit that multicasting will provide to local stations? If one assesses
burden in the context of all the revenue streams that will be pouring into
the coffers of licensees, granting public access to a sliver of bandwidth is
really not too much to ask of broadcasters, even if it were to overlook
the fact that broadcasters are exploiting a public resource for private
profit. 91 If Congress and broadcasters look prospectively at the question
of burden, it should be easy to conclude that broadcasters will come out
88. DotCast technology allows consumers to download movies directly to a Moviebeam settop box by utilizing the empty portions of a broadcasters analog transmission. Dotcast.com, About
Us, http://www.dotcast.com/about-us.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
89. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); id. § 304.
90. Subscribers might be willing to buy a decoder for MovieBeam's video on demand service,
but not for access channels. Beginning in the 1960s, the FCC experimented with Subscription
Television (STV), a Pay TV service which sent scrambled signals over the airwaves, but consumers
were not willing to commit to. the technology. Museum of Broadcast Communications, Pay
Television, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/P/htmlP/paytelevisio/paytelevisio.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2007).
91. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 2551 (2006) (In 2004 broadcasters
advertising revenue exceeded $47 billion.); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) (holding "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount").
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way ahead, even in the near future. Earmarking one programming
stream, for example, out of six or eight, is a small price to pay when the
broadcaster can program its several other sub-channels as if it were a
cable MSO.
In many respects, the type of access set-aside proposed here is not
altogether different from the public access channel set-asides that
Congress has already mandated for Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS")
providers,92 and the local public access channels that local communities
exact from their cable system franchisees.93 When a local MSO agrees to
a public access set-aside, it enters into that agreement freely, knowing
that in the final analysis, the benefit of the franchise will exceed its
costs. 94 So, too, with a bandwidth set-aside for digital broadcasters.
Congress, in essence, is the franchisor, furnishing licensees with the
windfall profits of multicasting. Congress could also condition the use of
broadcast spectrum multicasting on an up-front commitment by
licensees to set-aside public access conduit, just as it currently does with
DBS operators. Indeed, Congress determined that requiring satellite
systems to designate channels for public use was not too burdensome on
operators, a position that was upheld as constitutional in the D.C.
Circuit.95 The DBS set-asides, imposed by Congress on operators as a
public interest obligation, offers a close parallel for broadcast set-asides,
as both media use public spectrum and both do not involve third-party
franchisors.
While a sine qua non approach-trading access for the right to
multicast-sounds like a fair deal, it is unlikely to happen at this point.
For one thing, Congress, in the 1990s, granted digital broadcasters its
permission to multicast. 96 No conditions were placed on this specific
spectrum use, although some public interests advocates argued at the
time that licensees should be required to take on greater public interest
obligations in return. 97 Congress, in its effort to make the transition from
analog to digital as attractive as possible for incumbent broadcasters,
simply gave multicasting away, just as it gave broadcasters dibs on
digital spectrum, which would have otherwise fetched billions at

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
Service,

47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 532.
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760-61 (1996).
Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
47 U.S.C. § 336(b) (2000).
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast
Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,829 (1997).
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auction. Moreover, even if Congress fails to act, there is the question of
whether the FCC, acting on its own authority to promote the public
interest, could impose access rules on multicasters. On that score, the
FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry in 1999 to seek comment on the public
interest obligations of digital broadcasters, the results of which are still
pending. 99 Perhaps Congress, with the wisdom of hindsight, could revisit
the issue of conditioning multicast use of spectrum on access set-asides.
Perhaps a more activist FCC could permit digital broadcasters to provide
access in fulfillment of their public interest obligations. Either way,
broadcasters would likely mount stiff resistance to a change-of-heart
curtailment of spectrum use through its lobby and in the courts.
Fair or not, such a stick approach for broadcasters is unnecessary
when there is a carrot that broadcasters find irresistible-increasing
ownership caps. Although the FCC has been willing to consider an
increase in the percentage of national audience that any one company's
broadcast stations can reach in the aggregate, Congress has been moving
slowly on the issue. In 2003, when the FCC proposed increasing
ownership caps from thirty-five to forty-five percent of national
audience, Congress effectively preempted the agency by increasing the
cap to thirty-nine percent of national audience.' 0 0 Despite pressure from
the broadcasting lobby, the 107th Congress did not move ownership
caps higher, and with both the House and Senate controlled by
Democrats, such an increase appears less likely today. For broadcasters,
however, higher ownership caps remain the holy grail of industry
deregulation. Would CBS or FOX, eager to amass more stations, be
willing to trade free candidate access to its television stations in return
for relaxed ownership limits? Even if broadcasters were to say yes to
such a bargain, an incremental increase in caps in return for limited
access for politicians does not give a big enough benefit to the public. It
may be a step in the right direction, but it is little more than a small step
in the march toward public access. Citizens who are not candidates

98. Advanced Television Systems and their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast
Service, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R.

10,540, 10,545 (1995); see also Reed E. Hundt, Chairman of the FCC, Statement Before the Comm.
on

Commerce,

Sci.

and

Transp.

(Sept.

17,

1997),

available at http://www.fcc.gov/

Speeches/Hundt/spreh749.html (stating, that according to the Congressional Budget Office, the
give-away of DTV spectrum was worth about $10 billion).
99. Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. Docket
No.

99-360

(1999),

available

at

http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/Notices/1999/

fcc99390.doc.
100.

47 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1)(b) (Supp. IV 2004).
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would still have no access to stations, and broadcasters would receive
only a small amount of the deregulated market power they seek.
What this Article examines is a deal between government and
broadcasters that ups the ante. Under this deal, a broadcast company
may be able to get everything it wants when it comes to ownership caps,
including permission to broadcast to up to 100 percent of the national
audience. And the public gets a right of direct access to a portion of that
company's digital spectrum, in the form of one or more programming
streams. How much access for how much increased market
penetration-that is a question of metric that the FCC could determine in
tandem with broadcasters as part of its rule-making procedure. Congress
could also examine this issue of metric through hearings with
representatives of industry and the public. With the possibility of 100
percent market penetration on the table, broadcasters would likely have
interest in exploring a quid pro quo arrangement with the government.
VI.

METRICS

There are a number of ways that the relationship between increased
market penetration and bandwidth set-aside can be structured. The
simplest approach would be for Congress to offer a specified increase in
the ownership cap that would depend upon the amount of bandwidth set
aside by the broadcaster. Under this approach, Congress could raise an
individual broadcast company's limit by, let's say, a flat ten percent if a
broadcaster commits to some minimum amount of set-aside, such as a
single programming stream, or a single programming stream on certain
days or at certain hours. If the broadcaster participates in the program,
the broadcaster gets the increased market power. While simple to
implement, such an all-or-nothing approach may present problems for
broadcasters that would need to be addressed. Broadcast companies who
cannot afford to increase their holdings to meet a minimum, or do not
choose to, would not be able to participate, and thus lose their incentive
to granting access. At the same time, broadcasters who meet the
threshold to participate in the program have no incentive to increase
their access set-asides beyond the minimum proscribed by Congress.
These problems also would be present in any system which prescribes
specific tiers of market penetration in return for access. Once above the
threshold for a new tier, some broadcasters might want to game the
system so that they can amass as much market penetration as they can
without incurring an increase in access responsibility.
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A better approach for broadcasters and the public would be a scaled
access metric. Under this approach, Congress or the FCC can devise a
formula for access that would trade incremental units of increased
market power for incremental units of bandwidth set-aside. The relative
values of an access unit to a market power unit would need to be
determined by the parties, but, if the proper equivalency can be reached,
broadcasters would have more flexibility to fine-tune their licensee
acquisitions without regard to crossing a percentage threshold that could
mean a large step-up in access responsibility. Another advantage of
increments is that they could be treated as fungible-much like air rights
or pollution rights can be transferred among companies, it might be
possible to transfer some of a broadcast company's access units from
"access mature" markets to bandwidth in markets where participation in
the access for market power bargain is low. Scaled access also leaves
open the possibility that different rates of exchange could apply in
different markets, and rates can be adjusted progressively-like income
tax brackets-to increase or decrease access equivalency depending on a
broadcaster's accumulated audience reach.
While a scaled access metric could max out at a specified
percentage of national audience, it would be a more effective generator
of access for the public if Congress permitted broadcasters 100 percent
market penetration in return for some maximum amount of bandwidth
set-aside. How much access bandwidth is worth 100 percent of the
national audience for a broadcast company is an open question for the
parties to determine. Still, considering that Fox Television Broadcasting
alone made $2.3 billion in 2005 revenue from thirty-seven stations
covering thirty-nine percent of national audience, it would not be
unreasonable to expect a very high set-aside. 10 1 Even if doubling the
stations' audience reach would result in less than an additional $2.3
billion in revenue-Fox's licensees are already in top markets-the
revenue from these additional acquisitions would be huge. And Fox's
2005 figures do not take into account the windfall in revenue that, as
discussed above, will result as multicasting technology becomes more
widely used by digital Fox-owned stations. 10 2 Would Rupert Murdoch be
willing to provide enough bandwidth on his Fox stations to permit two
streams of public access operating simultaneously in order for his

101. Press Release, BIA Financial Network, Television Market Revenues Likely to Rise in
2006 (May 24, 2006), availableat www.bia.com/pressiteml .asp?id=1098.
102. Currently, most broadcasters are utilizing only one to two multicast streams. See NAB
Letter to FCC, supra note 30.
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company to have access to that additional revenue? That, of course,
remains to be seen.
VII.

OPPORTUNITIES, OBSTACLES, AND COMPLICATIONS

As tantalizing as the prospect of increased market power would be,
there are a number of details to work out, and potential problems to iron
out, before broadcasters would commit to bandwidth set-asides. One
concern broadcasters may have is how the quid pro quo would be
monitored for compliance. Whether Congress provides broadcasters with
a threshold, tiered or scaled relaxation of ownership caps, how can the
public be assured that it is getting the access that it is entitled to? Who
will provide the review necessary to ensure compliance? One of the
drawbacks of the system is that it may require a significant degree of
oversight given the number of stations that may participate, and the
varying levels of participation by broadcast companies. To address this
problem, system could be set up so that members of the public can verify
the amount of access that is available to them on any local station, either
through an automated web-accessible database, or through an inquiry at
the FCC. Presumably, local advocates for public access, including public
interest and community groups, could keep track of the access granted,
and file a complaint with the FCC for non-compliance. The system could
also place a notice requirement on broadcasters, so that viewers would
be aware of how much access time is being offered to them.
Penalties for non-compliance would also have to be determined
carefully. On the one hand, if the penalty is too lenient, then
broadcasters may be inattentive to compliance. On the other hand, the
prospect of a significant penalty could lead broadcasters to balk at
participating in the system. At a minimum, it would appear that a
forfeiture schedule would make sense. Imposing fines for noncompliance allows the government to recoup some of the loss of the
public's access entitlement. In cases of egregious, repeated, or deliberate
non-compliance, higher fines could be levied and/or license suspension
or revocation applied. Whatever the penalties, enforcement of the system
would be consistent with the FCC's existing authority under the
Communications Act, and subject to judicial review.
Oversight may also be an issue with respect to selection criteria for
public access. Who selects the speakers, and on what basis are they
selected? For a system of public access to work on a large scale,
broadcasters must be free to grant access on a content neutral basis.
Whether selection is made by lottery, first-come, or some other process,
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it is important for a number of reasons that broadcasters remain
disengaged from the content. First, if broadcasters determine access
based on content, then they are asserting a measure of editorial controland functioning as mediators of content-when the goal should be to let
the public set its own agenda. Second, broadcasters are rightly wary of
trying to be a gatekeeper of citizen content that they do not control.
Citizens who are unhappy or offended with public access content would
be more likely to hold a local station accountable if they thought the
station made an editorial decision to air it, and those excluded from
access would similarly have cause to complain. With content neutrality,
broadcasters could be given immunity from liability for the content that
airs on its access bandwidth. Congress provides immunity from
defamation when broadcasters are compelled to give candidates "equal
time" under section 315(a) of the Communications Act; 10 3 so, too, could
they grant broadcasters blanket immunity from public access content.
It is important, however, to emphasize that content-neutral selection
criteria may involve a measure of discretion on the part of the
broadcaster. This discretion may be necessary if Congress wants to use
this public access system to address the historically elusive issue of
localism. In order to promote localism, Congress may want to empower
broadcasters to select speakers who are local residents or who seek to
speak on a topic of local interest. If Congress decides that it wants to
give a selection advantage for local-oriented content, such an initiative
might very well be viewed as content neutral by the courts. In Turner II,
after all, the Court did say that a statute designed to promote local
programming could be content neutral.10 4 Irrespective of constitutional
issues, broadcasters should refrain from making decisions based on
viewpoint-at best they should do no more than apply a template of
localism to all who apply for access.
To the extent that it wants, Congress can give broadcasters the
option of allowing for national access, as well as local access. National
access would enable a citizen applicant to distribute its message over all
of a broadcaster's access channels, potentially extending that message's
reach to the aggregate national audience of the broadcaster. A national
access option would allow local perspectives to be exchanged in
different parts of the country-or at least in different markets. To do
this, Congress could simply require, or allow, broadcasters to set aside

103. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000).
104. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 180, 230 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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two windows-by time or bandwidth-for local and national reach. In
this respect, the windows are not unlike the Chain Broadcasting
Regulations, which designate different dayparts for locally and
nationally distributed programming. One of the drawbacks of doing this
is that there would be far 'fewer slots available for the public in a
locality, since the resources are being shared across the entire station
group's holdings. One way to address any bottlenecking would be for
local stations to timeshift out-of-area content to hours in less demand. A
speaker local to New York might be able to secure a "prime-time"
access slot on WNYW-DT's access stream, but viewers of Los
Angeles's Fox station would see the New York message overnight, or on
a Saturday morning.
Because content placed on the access set-aside would be
unmediated, indecency may also be a concern for Congress and
segments of the public. While it is a simple matter to immunize a
broadcaster from indecent content transmitted over the access set-aside,
those concerned about children's access to indecency would still want to
have some mechanism in place to protect young viewers from seeing
inappropriate content. To protect children, and help concerned parents,
government has two options. First, broadcasters can be required to have
supervisory systems in place so that indecent programming can be
filtered outside of safe harbor hours. This community-based supervisory
system is what is currently in use to monitor content on cable providers'
public access channels. The FCC has recognized that this community
involvement has reduced the likelihood that children would be exposed
to indecency on cable access channels, and so has a plurality of the
Supreme Court. If Congress were to decide that broadcasters could be
held liable for indecency on public access, then it could implement a
certification process to protect broadcasters. Used currently by cable
providers, this process would protect broadcasters from indecency
liability if a supervisory community group certifies that the content is
appropriate.
Broadcasters, and the public, would be better served if Congress
adopted spatial zoning to protect children from accessing indecency.
This approach, proposed by Justice O'Connor in Reno v. ACLU as a way
to combat Internet indecency, would call for the creation of "adult
zones" where children could be barred from access. 10 5 For O'Connor,
spatial zoning laws are permissible if they do not "unduly restrict adult
105. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 887-95 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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access to the material"' 0 6 and if "minors have no First Amendment right
to read or view the banned material. '0 7 Although O'Connor
acknowledges that anonymous use of the Internet makes it difficult to
prevent children from entering adult zones unless barriers are
constructed to identify users, this difficulty is not an issue for digital
broadcast spectrum. For broadcasters, spatial zoning would simply mean
segregating indecent content on a specially "zoned" portion of the access
bandwidth. Adults who wish to, can restrict children's access to this
segregated sub-channel by blocking this sub-channel on their digital
televisions. Unlike the V-Chip, a household could block out access to
the entire channel. And unlike current indecency regulations, there is no
need to "channel" indecent speech into an overnight "safe harbor." With
spatial zoning, the channeling is spectrum-based, not time-based-if
indecent content, as defined by the government, is segregated onto this
special channel, then broadcasters would be safe from liability.
Indecency could thus be available to adults, who have a First
Amendment right to access it, at any time of day. At times when there is
no indecent content to air on public access, the broadcaster can
reapportion the spectrum to other uses such as adding another program
stream, or improving the resolution quality of its main signal. Such are
the special benefits of multicasting technology.
Another concern that broadcasters might have with this public
access system is infrastructure and staffing. Should the government
require local stations to designate studio space for public use?
Communities have exacted studio commitments from cable providers as
a condition for a local franchise, but should broadcasters bear the costs
of a system that might be in constant use by citizens? If the cost turns
out to be too big for broadcasters to absorb, Congress could explore
ways to reduce this burden. One way would be for broadcasters to
charge a fee for studio use. Citizens would not have to use the station's
facilities, but if they opted to, they would pay a nominal or modest
amount to cover the station's costs. Another approach would be for
stations to pool their resources by providing one access studio for use by
all participating stations in that local market. This economy of scale
would make sense, however, only if the number of people electing to use
studio facilities remained relatively small.
Perhaps the best approach would be to shift the burden of
production squarely on viewers themselves or on communities. In this

106.
107.

Id. at 888.
Id.
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age of YouTube and ubiquitous cell phones camcorders, it is nearly costfree for citizens to make their own audio-visual content for public
access. Those who are willing or able to edit, can use computer software
to make their contributions look more professional or artistic. But
professional product is not the goal for public access-getting the
message out is. To that extent, if people of modest means do not have
access to video equipment, public libraries or other community
institutions could make cameras and microphones available for "pro
bono" use. Of course, one of the drawbacks of citizen-made video is that
it will not be intelligible or audible. That is a price that viewers may
have to pay.
For the system to be economical, broadcasters need to be able to
keep access staff to a minimum. Still, it would likely be necessary for a
broadcaster to have screeners of content, or at least staff to work as
liaisons with community monitors, so that localized content can be
favored, and indecency segregated. Moreover, since some citizens may
want-or need-to contribute content in languages other than English,
broadcasters may need to hire special services on a contract basis.
Ultimately, for the access plan to work, broadcasters would need to view
these costs as de minimus in light of the revenue windfall of increased
market penetration. If a broadcaster thinks the costs are too high, then it
simply can decide not to participate in the quid pro quo.
Indeed, a number of broadcasters will not participate in the access
for market power bargain. Independently owned stations, small station
groups, or any company not seeking to increase market penetration
would continue to operate without access set-asides, as they currently
do. Over time, if more companies vie for the additional market share
available under the quid pro quo system, there will be a reduction in the
number of independently owned stations in local markets. At first blush,
a scarcity of locally owned stations may appear bad for diversity. But
diversity would not be harmed if the disappearing independent station is
being replaced by a conglomerate-owned station with local citizen
access. While increased concentration of ownership might mean less
opportunity for women or minorities to acquire licenses to operate
stations, unmediated broadcast access would give these underrepresented groups the opportunity to transmit content in a manner not
beholden to the homogenizing reality of the marketplace. Since citizen
access would offer viewers unmediated exposure to locally originated
content, one could argue that diversity-and localism-would be
enhanced by the entrance of additional access spectrum into the
community. As it is, much of the commercial programming that airs
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today on local stations is syndicated fare such as off-net sitcoms, game
shows, and movies. To the extent that a local station has found it
profitable to air local news and public affairs programming, the station's
new owners could continue to air those shows-in addition to the access
bandwidth.
For those who are interested in using broadcast spectrum to attract
mass audiences to their messages, a scheme of unmediated access likely
would not address their needs. One of the challenges of a diverse and
fragmented system of access bandwidth streams is the content will
attract only a trickle of viewers, the majority of whom would remain
tuned in to the commercial content available on the broadcaster's
primary channels. As a result, instituting a public access system would
perpetuate an inequitable relationship between incumbent broadcasters
with audience reach and the rest of the public, with little or no reach.
The best that can be said for unmediated access is that it may provide an
opportunity for broadcasters and the public to ease, if not remedy, the
inequality between the audience "haves" and "have-nots." A formula
based on both bandwidth and time would allow broadcasters, if the
incentive were high enough, to accept a system that would include
access, based on time, on their "primary" bandwidth. But even if access
to primary bandwidth were put in place, it would likely not change the
status quo for audience reach. The future of television viewing in the age
of digital viewing recorders is that many people will likely use
technology to pinpoint the content they want to view, or filter the
material they want to avoid. Does that mean that there would be no
audience watching the public access program? Well, to some extent, that
may indeed be the case. Perhaps a citizen with a redundant or incoherent
message will attract few or none to his access program. But, at the same
time, speakers with an interesting message or strong production values
may have an opportunity to build a mass audience. In this respect, this is
how the Internet has worked for independent filmmakers and bloggers.
With the Internet, true mass market success would occur only when the
purveyors of Internet content make the jump to a mass audience medium
such as television or cinema. With unmediated broadcast access, one can
continue to build a mass audience without transitioning to a commercial
programming service-unless he or she wants to.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If broadcast conglomerates accept that providing viewer access to
their spectrum is a price they are willing to pay for market penetration, it
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may be possible to extend the reach of access to non-broadcast holdings
of the conglomerate. What this means is that broadcasters who own
newspapers could voluntarily set aside space in their newspapers in
return for increased broadcast ownership caps. The equation here would
be the same for broadcasters: they get the chance to buy more television
stations; the only difference is that the access metric would be applied to
newsprint space instead of digital spectrum. Why should the
conglomerate care if the access provided is in a different medium?
Applying the logic of the quid pro quo bargain to newspapers, would not
run afoul of Miami Herald v. Tornillo since the newsprint access would
be voluntary on the part of the publisher. Moreover, since the access
system would select speakers without regard to content, it would be hard
to argue that the government incentive program would interfere with
editorial discretion, which was the major concern voiced in Tornillo.
If a quid pro quo access for market penetration model can be made
to work, the benefits to the public would be immense. Citizens can use
the airwaves not merely to respond to the mediated agenda of a
broadcaster; they can create and distribute their own agendas. In many
respects, dedicated public broadcast access would bring the type of
unfiltered diversity and localism that Congress and the FCC envisioned
for broadcasting before the rise of the networks as national
programmers. As with the Internet, citizens would be able to post and
view scripted narratives, v-blogs, original music performances, or
political rants. And while it may be that many people will tune out
public access content, the possibility that people will use the airwaves to
air fresh, unmediated messages is exciting.
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